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Abstract: 
In light of the perceived benefits derived from inward FDI, many developed economies have 
systematically established investment promotion agencies (IPAs) to attract foreign 
investment. While IPAs in the past have been created by a wide variety of countries and 
regions, their target economies have overwhelmingly been in developed markets. The rise 
of emerging market MNEs is significantly changing this picture. We analyse the impact of 
IPAs on attracting emerging market FDI to developed economies by looking at the example 
of Chinese FDI into Canada. We find strong statistical evidence that the presence of 
Canadian provincial-level IPAs located in China increases the likelihood of Chinese firms 
locating in that Canadian province. Focusing on the role of IPAs in lowering liabilities of 
foreignness, we explore how differences in host and home country contexts may explain our 
findings. 
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Developed Economy Investment Promotion Agencies and 
Emerging Market Foreign Direct Investment 
1. Introduction 
Attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) has become an increasingly important objective 
for developed economies. This is because inward FDI may have numerous benefits for host 
economies, including such things as access to capital, productivity spill-overs, innovation 
spill-overs and employment creation (Bobonis & Shatz, 2007). The benefits of FDI for 
developed economies, therefore, constitute a potentially significant source of economic 
growth. Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozean, & Sayek (2006), for instance, found, ‘increases in the 
share of FDI or the relative productivity of the foreign firm leads to higher additional growth 
in financially developed economies’ (p 1). 
In light of the perceived benefits derived from generating FDI, many developed economies 
have systematically implemented policies which target foreign MNEs. Chief among these 
policies is the establishment of investment promotion agencies (IPAs) (K. Head & Ries, 
2010).  The establishment of IPAs to generate FDI is not, however, a new phenomenon.  
These policy initiatives have been actively pursued by both developed and emerging 
economies for well over 30 years (Morisset, 2003). While the sources of IPAs have 
traditionally been heterogeneous across global economies, target economies have 
overwhelmingly been developed economies, such as North America and Europe. 
Historically, focusing on generating FDI from developed economies made economic sense, 
as the vast majority of FDI flows came from developed country MNEs.  
The rise of emerging market (EM) MNEs has fundamentally altered this one-way stream of 
FDI from developed economies to the rest of the world (Sauvant, Maschek, & McAllister, 
2010). FDI from emerging markets now makes up an increasingly large share of global FDI 
flows. As of 2012, for example, EM firms constituted around 25% of all outward FDI flows 
globally (Contractor, 2013; UNCTAD, 2013). China, for example, now invests heavily outside 
its borders to ensure such things as natural resource security (Zweig & Bi, 2005). The 
increasing importance of emerging markets as a source of FDI has not gone unnoticed and 
policy-makers in both developed and developing economies have looked to attract their 
share of these investments. Today, for example, the majority of IPAs representing the 
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Canadian province of British Columbia are located in emerging markets, not developed 
markets.  In fact, British Columbia has more offices in China than in any other target 
economy. The emergence of EM firms as important sources of FDI has created an 
aggregated focal shift in IPA policy strategy in some cases, and a simple expansion of the 
scope of IPAs to target developing economies in other cases. 
Why might IPAs be a useful policy-tool? IPAs may lower the transaction cost of investing in a 
particular location through the dissemination of information and services that may not 
otherwise be readily accessible to foreign firms. IPAs may be effective in lowering a foreign 
firm’s entry costs, particularly with regards to the ‘liability of foreignness’ (LOF) in the host 
economy.  LOF deals primarily with the fact that, ‘multinational enterprises (MNEs) doing 
business abroad face costs (Hymer, 1976; Kindleberger, 1969) arising from the unfamiliarity 
of the environment, from cultural, political, and economic differences, and from the need 
for coordination across geographic distances’ (Zaheer, 1995, p. 341).  It is argued LOF 
presents barriers to entry for foreign firms and that the psychic distances (i.e. 
environmental, cultural, political, and economic differences) between two developed 
economies (such as Canada and Germany) are less than those between developed and 
developing economies (such as Canada and China) (Ronen & Shenkar, 2013).  In this light, it 
is interesting to consider whether IPAs are now becoming more important facilitators of FDI 
flows, given the potentially greater psychic distances encountered in attracting investment 
flows from emerging to developed markets. It is perhaps not a coincidence that many IPAs 
have been established with the aim of targeting psychically distant emerging market firms, 
those with high levels of LOF. This expansion in scope, however, represents new challenges 
for developed economy IPAs, as they must look to effectively mitigate LOF and entice EM 
MNEs to undertake FDI in markets with which they are not familiar. 
The academic literature on IPAs is limited. Several studies have analysed IPAs, in particular 
looking at the impact of IPAs on the generation of inward FDI to the region where the IPA is 
located (Bobonis & Shatz, 2007; Coughlin & Segev, 2000a; C. K. Head, Ries, & Swenson, 
1999; Lim, 2008; Morisset, 2003; Wilkinson & Brouthers, 2000; Woodward, 1992).  
However, many of these studies are now dated. Moreover, as far as we are aware, the 
impact of IPAs on the investment behaviour of EM FDI has not been studied. This is a 
potentially interesting question, not only for policy related reasons (i.e. how do we 
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formulate policies to attract EM MNEs?), but also because there are some interesting 
conceptual issues to explore. It is widely conjectured that EM MNEs may actually be 
different to developed market MNEs (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012; Hennart, 2012; Narula, 2012; 
Ramamurti, 2012). While this question is far from resolved, if such things as EM domestic 
market institutions (i.e. home country-specific advantages) lead to idiosyncratic investment 
behaviours in EM MNEs (via, for example, their impact on firm-specific advantages), it is far 
from clear that the findings of the aforementioned IPA studies will apply to EM MNEs. There 
may also be EM MNE specific factors which influence the success or failure of IPAs. For 
example, a recently developed strand of literature suggests EM MNEs particularly seek 
strategic assets in developed markets (Luo & Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2006). If this is correct, 
perhaps developed market IPAs need to adjust their strategies accordingly. Such questions 
regarding the role of IPAs remain under researched. By exploring IPAs of developed market 
origin working in emerging markets we may also be able to shed further light on the salient 
features of EM MNEs and the related conceptual discussions. 
The primary question this study asks is, therefore, whether developed economy IPAs aid in 
the generation of FDI from EMs. We model FDI from a specific developing economy (China) 
to a specific developed market (Canada) using data from 2003-2013. More specifically, we 
evaluate Chinese FDI into Canadian provinces to explore how provincial-level IPAs impact 
the location decision of Chinese MNEs. Our empirical modelling draws primarily from 
constructs developed in mainstream International Business literature, including LOF and 
psychic distance, which predicts the propensity to invest in a location, ceteris paribus, may 
decrease with increased levels of psychic distance (Lim, 2008).  Interestingly, we find that 
the presence of IPAs significantly increases the propensity for a Chinese firm to locate in a 
given province, giving some credence to the idea that IPAs may be an effective means of 
attracting EM MNE FDI to developed markets. 
This paper proceeds as follows. First, we provide a literature review from which we develop 
our hypotheses. The data and methodology are then described, followed by the discussion 
of results, policy implications and conclusions. 
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2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
 
2.1 Investment promotion agencies and FDI generation 
IPAs are often governmental organizations, funded by regional or national government 
agencies to promote inward investment. The impact of IPAs in generating FDI has been 
studied for over 25 years.  The seminal work of Wells and Wint (1990) was among the first 
to question the effectiveness of IPAs in generating inward FDI. They determined IPAs offer 
benefits to countries in much the same way marketing campaigns benefit for-profit 
organizations. In an updated version of this work, Wells and Wint (2001) define IPAs rather 
broadly, as ‘activities that disseminate information about, or attempt to create an image of 
the investment site and provide investment services for the prospective investors’ (p. 4) (we 
also adopt this definition). They go on to identify four main functions of the IPA: image 
building, investor facilitation, investment generation and policy advocacy.  
The task of image building is to create the perception of a given market as an attractive 
location for FDI at the national or sub-national level (Lim, 2008). An example of this would 
be Ontario, Canada’s IPA branding its province as the financial centre of Canada.  Ontario’s 
IPAs, for example, prominently showcase the majority of banks in Canada being 
headquartered in Ontario, as well as having the largest stock market in Canada and a large 
number of finance professionals. Through branding itself as the premier Canadian location 
for financial investment, it hopes to gain the majority of foreign investment in this niche 
area. 
Advising on, and sometimes expediting, approval processes, facilitating the purchase or 
lease of physical sites, setting up utilities accounts and the like all encompass the facilitator 
role IPAs play. According to Morisset (2003), ‘Investor facilitation and investor services refer 
to the range of services provided in a host country that can assist an investor in analysing 
investment decisions, establishing a business, and maintaining it in good standing’ (p. 7). 
Canadian IPAs, for example, attempt to make applying for and obtaining business licenses a 
transparent process at both the provincial and national level. IPAs also provide highly 
specific services to help navigate complex rules, regulations and expectations of, for 
example, natural resource extraction FDI. More specifically, IPAs may give examples from 
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past investments on how ‘net socio-economic benefit’ to the host country was derived.  This 
will generally help investing organizations assess the potential value of the intended 
investment, as well as increase the chances of the investment being approved. 
IPAs play an important on-the-ground role in nurturing positive relationships between 
target firms and their respective governmental counterparts. A further refinement to 
investment facilitation is, therefore, the role IPAs take in match-making and logistical 
support of high-level government-to-government relationships. Positive ambassadorial-level 
diplomatic ties have, for example, been found to facilitate increased levels of trade (Ciuriak, 
2014). Regarding Chinese outward FDI, Zhang, Jiang and Zhou (2014) recently found 
‘bilateral senior visits improve the awareness of, or foster the positive sentiment toward, 
the investing country, creating a more friendly investment environment for foreign 
companies to overcome the liabilities of foreignness’ (p. 219). In many cases, IPAs act as an 
important facilitator of provincial trade missions headed by provincial premiers. British 
Columbia’s Premier, Christy Clark, for example, led a trade mission to China in November 
2013 with intentions to ‘advance liquefied natural gas (LGN) development opportunities and 
promote the province as a stable and attractive destination for trade and investment’ 
(British Columbia, 2013, p. 1). Premier Clark’s investment promotion activities in China were 
facilitated by British Columbia’s IPAs (British Columbia, 2013). Relatedly, IPAs also attempt 
to enhance export opportunities for home province businesses. This is done through 
creating linkages between host economy governmental actors or businesses and home 
province businesses. 
IPAs also engage in direct marketing campaigns. Such pointed investment generation 
initiatives generally include targeting specific companies or industries and subsequently 
mailing investment information, sending emails, attending trade shows, hosting forums and 
seminars, and otherwise increasing the visibility of investment opportunities to a targeted 
group of organizations (Wells & Wint, 1990).  Provincial Canadian IPA employees attending 
the China Mining Conference and Exhibition coordinated by the Tianjin Municipal 
Government and China Mining Association is an example of investment generation 
marketing initiatives. 
The final major function of IPAs is policy advocacy. According to Morisset (2003), policy 
advocacy consists of ‘the activities through which the agency supports initiatives to improve 
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the quality of the investment climate and identifies the views of the private sector on that 
matter. Activities include surveys of the private sector, participation in task forces, policy 
and legal procedures, and lobbying’ (p. 7). In this way, IPAs are tasked with listening to what 
potential investors would like to change in the investment environment which the IPA 
represents. IPAs then actively engage with policy makers to facilitate those changes.  An 
example of this bottom-up approach might be a request to raise the minimum investment 
values which are subject to review under the Investment Canada Act of 1985. As of 2015, 
WTO members wishing to acquire a business in Canada for more than $369 million must 
undergo review to assess whether the investment is of ‘net benefit’ to Canada (Industry 
Canada, 2015).  If there is significant pushback to raise this investment threshold by 
potential investors, the IPA may attempt to lobby the national-level government for change. 
While there are four main functions of IPAs which are commonly discussed in the literature, 
the primary overarching objective of foreign investment promotion agencies is to generate 
FDI (Wells & Wint, 1990).  This goal is facilitated through the dissemination of information 
which may otherwise be an impediment to investment owing to a lack of nuanced 
understanding of potential host economies’ cultural, political and economic environmental 
differences (Lim, 2008).  Morisset (2003) echoes this view, ‘[investment] promotion 
agencies are viewed as vehicles for addressing coordination and information issues’ (p. 7). In 
other words, one of the main objectives of IPAs is to mitigate the liabilities of foreignness 
caused by, among other things, information asymmetries and differences in culture and 
business practices.  
  
2.2 Overcoming liabilities of foreignness 
Zaheer (1995) defines LOF as, ‘all additional costs a firm operating in a market overseas 
incurs that a local firm would not incur’ (p. 343). He goes on to categorize these costs based 
on other similarities, such as unfamiliarity with the local environment and lack of legitimacy 
in the host economy. A key thread throughout the extensive LOF literature set is that LOF 
raises the cost of conducting investment in a qualitatively dissimilar economy. Further, there 
is a positive relationship between cost and psychic distance of the home and host 
economies (Ellis, 2008). Morisset (2003), for example, concludes, ‘the finding that 
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promotion is positively associated with FDI inflows across countries has to be qualified 
because it is closely linked to the environment in which the agency operates’ (p. 18). 
Determining the psychic distance between two economies, however, is not a straight 
forward calculation. Rather, it is a multifaceted interpretation of macro-level socio-
economic factors such as language, religion and level of economic and institutional 
development (Blomkvist & Drogendijk, 2013). 
There have been several attempts to analyse the impact of IPAs.  While a few of these 
studies find IPAs have a positive and significant impact on the generation of FDI  (Bobonis & 
Shatz, 2007; Lim, 2008; Morisset, 2003; Wells & Wint, 1990; Woodward, 1992), the majority 
of studies find IPAs do not have a significant impact on the location choice of FDI (Coughlin 
& Segev, 2000b; C. K. Head et al., 1999; K. Head & Ries, 2010; Kotabe, 1993; Martin, 2003; 
Wilkinson & Brouthers, 2000; Wint & Williams, 2002). Until very recently, however, the vast 
majority of IPAs focused on generating FDI were located in developed economies, generally 
in nations that possessed large pools of globally competitive firms. IPAs, moreover, 
regardless of the home country’s economic development (i.e. both developed and 
developing countries) also generally targeted developed economies as sources of FDI.  As 
Wilkinson & Brouthers, (2000) observe, ‘the pattern of trade offices in many respects 
follows the world pattern of trade, with the overwhelming majority of trade offices located 
in either developed nations or newly industrialized nations of the Pacific Rim’ (p. 231). Yet, 
as noted, it has been hypothesised that EM MNEs may be different to MNEs of developed 
market origin (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012). As such, the generally insignificant relationship found 
between inward FDI and IPAs may not hold in the case for EM MNEs today.  
Traditionally, developed economies pursue inward FDI to further build competencies and 
competition as well as generate employment. Developing economies actively seek to attract 
FDI in order to spur knowledge spill-overs in production techniques, product innovation and 
managerial knowhow as well as provide adequate employment opportunities for its citizens.  
Therefore, while the individual importance of each initiative may vary according to 
development level, the overall goals have been largely similar (i.e. further development). 
Historically, the most promising avenues for attaining these FDI goals were found 
predominately in developed economy firms (Wilkinson & Brouthers, 2000). 
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For developed economy IPAs, this constituted a decided advantage in alleviating the 
additional costs of international investment due to lower levels of LOF. This is seen to be 
true as the level of economic development is a major factor in determining psychic distance 
and, in turn, the extra transaction costs involved in international expansion. Blomkvist & 
Drogendijk (2012) note, ‘the importance of differences in the degree of 
industrialization…will affect the intensity of the activities of the firms in a foreign market’ (p. 
667). Firms from economies such as the United Kingdom, for example, will have 
comparatively lower levels of LOF, and in turn transaction costs, when entering psychically 
near Canada compared to firms from psychically distant China.  In a recent review of the EM 
literature, Contractor (2013) comes to much the same conclusion: 
EMMs [EM MNEs] suffer not only from the LOF (Eden and Miller, 2004; Zaheer, 
1995) that all internationally expanding firms face, but do so to a greater degree. 
This is because EMMs have only recently internationalized, and because EMMs 
operating in advanced nation markets face larger institutional and cultural distance, 
than in the traditional patterns of FDI flows when a multinational from one 
developed nation invested in another developed country 
(Contractor, 2013, p. 321) 
One important reason for high levels of psychic distance are differences in home 
institutional environments from which EM MNEs and developed economy firms expand 
(Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012; Hennart, 2012; Ramamurti, 2012).  
Contractor (2013) comments, ‘institutions are less-developed in emerging nations, so that 
their firms face an environment of “institutional voids” (Khanna and Palepu, 2006). Hence 
successful ventures by EMMs abroad – and particularly EMM expansion into advanced 
nations – would seem fraught with obstacles’ (p. 316). Contractor (2013) goes on to argue 
that ‘institutional voids’ between EM and developed economies can be seen as a decided 
advantage for EM MNEs expanding into other emerging markets. Others (Cuervo-Cazurra & 
Genc, 2008; Guillen & Carcia-Canal, 2009; Khanna & Palepu, 2010; Ramamurti, 2012) echo 
this view citing EM MNEs enhanced ability to cope with the inefficient capital markets, poor 
enforcement of local and international laws, capricious bureaucrats and erratic regulations 
which typify EM institutional environments.  The ability of EM MNEs to operate effectively 
in emerging market economies other than their own does not, however, translate into the 
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ability to operate in markets with highly developed institutions. The findings in this strand of 
research complement LOF theories.  Institutional voids increase the transaction costs of 
expanding from an EM to a developed economy primarily due to increased levels of 
information asymmetries. Moreover, it is generally considered that the motivations for EM 
MNE FDI, particularly that to developed markets, is strongly motivated by the aggressive 
seeking of intangible strategic assets which are used to build up competitive advantages 
(Mathews, 2006).  In other words, some of the motivation for FDI may also be somewhat 
different, as EM MNEs themselves may also be dissimilar to developed market MNEs (Luo & 
Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2006). In this case, IPAs may help EM MNEs compensate for the 
dearth of operating experience in developed economies. 
Due to the large gap in psychic distance between EM firms and developed economies, the 
value derived from the services provided by developed economy IPAs located in emerging 
markets, rather than other developed economies, may be valuable. If, for example, a 
developed economy IPA is able to bridge information asymmetries and subsequently lower 
transaction costs associated with LOF, the propensity for EM MNEs to invest in that 
economy may be increased.  The key research question we address, therefore, is whether 
the presence of a developed economy IPA located in an EM increases the likelihood that an 
EM firm will invest in a given developed market location. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data 
We analyse Chinese FDI into Canadian provinces.  This is done for four main reasons. First, 
EM MNEs from countries such as China often engage in natural resource seeking behaviour 
(Zweig & Bi, 2005), especially in large natural resource rich countries such as Canada. As 
such, natural resource rich countries are likely to be important host countries for EM MNEs. 
The majority of Chinese FDI into Canada, for example, is in the natural resource extraction 
sector.  In terms of value of Chinese FDI in Canada, mining represents 97% of all investment 
from 2003-2013.  Regarding the number of investments (frequency count) mining 
represents 64% of all investment. Tables 1 and 2 break down Chinese investments in Canada 
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by industrial sector.  On the surface, this could be problematic as Chinese firms may simply 
be investing in provinces with large natural resource reserves. Upon closer investigation of 
detailed provincial-level data, however, it was found that Canada is a large natural resource-
rich country with a substantial and pervasive natural resource endowment found in almost 
every province and territory.  Newfoundland and Labrador, for example, is geographically 
the 10th largest province (including territories) in Canada, but in our period of study (2003-
2013) it registered the highest natural resource exports per square kilometre.  Larger 
provinces such as Québec (approximately the size of France, Spain and Germany combined) 
registered high aggregate natural resource exports, but once the size of the province was 
taken into account natural resource export levels were found to be slightly below the 
average for Canadian provinces.  In other words, as long as natural resources and size (as 
well as other key control variables) are controlled for it should be possible to effectively 
tease out the efficacy of IPAs in a sub-national ‘competition’ for Chinese FDI in a country 
such as Canada. In other developed countries which are rich in natural resources, such as 
Australia, natural resource endowment is not nearly as evenly spread as in Canada, thus 
making controlling for natural resources much more difficult.  
 
******** TABLES 1 & 2 ABOUT HERE ******** 
 
Second, host provincial and national-level governments are typically involved in large 
natural-resource related FDI transactions.  This is primarily concerned with trust.  On the 
one hand, the investing company has a strong interest in ensuring their investment is 
protected from privatization and other unfavourable future political circumstances.  On the 
other hand, the host economy has a vested stake in ensuing the investing firm is socially 
responsible and provides a substantial net social, economic and environmental benefit to 
the host economy.  Within an economy such as Canada, determining whether a natural 
resource extraction investment provides a net gain is highly equivocal depending on the 
concerned interest group (i.e. financial investment firms may evaluate ‘net gain’ differently 
than staunch environmental protection groups).  Adding the complexity of high levels of 
psychic and institutional distance can only serve to exacerbate an already contentious issue. 
This is true of firms from China which are sometimes seen by outsiders to operate in a 
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‘growth at all costs’ institutional environment which may be incongruent with developed 
economies’ long-term goals. This is especially true in the case of Chinese FDI as (natural 
resource) investment projects from China are dominated by state-owned firms (SOEs). In 
response to this consideration, in 2012 Canadian investment regulatory bodies (i.e. those 
under the control of the Minister of Industry) clarified its approach to investments made by 
SOEs in an amendment to the Invest in Canada Act which involves much higher levels of 
scrutiny for SOEs’ investments in Canada than ever before. Appeasing host national and 
subnational governments, which theoretically represents all interest groups in a democratic 
society, therefore, is highly important for both the investing firms and the host economy. 
One important medium for disseminating information or acting as a catalyst for FDI 
discussion may be the IPA. Canada, therefore, provides an excellent arena for testing the 
efficacy of developed economy IPAs in generating EM FDI. 
Third, IPA development policy at the sub-national level in Canada is typical of many 
developed economies. Historically, most provincial Canadian IPAs targeted, almost 
exclusively, other developed economies to generate inward FDI. The emergence of EMs as 
key players on the outward FDI scene, however, precipitated an expansion in the scope of 
most provincial IPA office portfolios to include large developing economies. Ontario for 
instance, currently maintains IPAs in China, France, Germany, India, Japan, Mexico, United 
Kingdom and United States.  Ontario has more than one office in only two countries – China 
and United States. The number of employees in the China offices is, however, approximately 
2.5 times higher than the US offices.  Although Ontario currently generates higher levels of 
FDI from other source countries, the drastic expansion of resources in China infers it is now 
the most important IPA destination in the world for Ontario.  The IPA policy in British 
Columbia has a slightly different focus with IPAs in Japan (1), South Korea (1), China (4), 
India (3), United States (3 – all in California), and United Kingdom (1). Within British 
Columbian IPAs the country with by far the most employees is China. Similarly to Ontario, 
this indicates China is the most important outpost for IPAs, again despite higher inward FDI 
flows from other source countries. Although developed economies still constitute the 
majority of IPA locations from Ontario and British Columbia, the increasing importance of 
IPAs located in EMs is unmistakable. This trend is representative of developed countries, 
either on a national or subnational level, in many major economies. 
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Finally, Chinese FDI data in Canada is comparatively reliable and detailed. Dependent 
variable data, as a result, are able to account for the use of tax havens and offshore financial 
centres as intermediaries for subsequent FDI into Canada. In this way, ultimate beneficiary 
ownership, as defined by the OECD’s most current benchmark definition of FDI, is used 
(OECD, 2008). To date many studies on EM MNE outward FDI have not properly accounted 
for the frequent use of offshore tax havens and financial centres to channel FDI. Instead, 
they use official data sources, which are, unfortunately, prone to measurement problems 
inherent in the earlier OECD guidelines (Beugelsdijk, Hennart, Slangen, & Smeets, 2010; 
Kolstad & Wiig, 2012). Given tax haven jurisdictions are the major destinations as well as 
source countries for Chinese MNE FDI, it is in fact very important to account for their use 
(Kolstad & Wiig, 2012; Liu & Scott-Kennel, 2011; Rodríguez & Bustillo, 2011; Rosen & 
Hanemann, 2011; Sutherland & Anderson, 2014). 
 
3.1.1 Dependent and independent variables 
In this subnational-level study the dependent variable used is Chinese acquisition and 
greenfield investments across all thirteen Canadian provinces and territories for the time 
period 2003-2013.  In this case, there are two main methods for regressing panel data: by 
value and count.  Using yearly aggregated investment dollar amounts for a given year and 
province for the dependent variable is typically seen to represent the quality of investment.  
Using yearly aggregated counts of investments, on the other hand, generally represents the 
quantity of investments.  In the case of EM FDI into a large, resource-rich economy, 
however, the dollar amounts of investment may be dominated by large natural resource-
related investments, thus rendering smaller greenfield investment less important. Chinese 
company Sinopec’s $2.148 billion (USD) purchase of Calgary-based Daylight Energy, for 
example, risks diminishing the importance of more incremental greenfield investments such 
as Daqo New Energy’s investment in Ontario of $5.17 million (USD) in the solar power 
industry or Linyi Shandong Biological Product’s manufacturing facility investment in 
Manitoba of $50 million (USD).  Due to the very large monetary value natural resource 
investments demand, it could be argued using count models are more appropriate for this 
study. When using count models all investments are weighted equally, regardless of size.  In 
light of the above conundrum, we estimate models using dependent variables for both 
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value and count. Value-based models utilize random effects generalized least squares 
models and count models use random effects negative binomial models.  Independent 
variables are kept consistent across models. 
Dependent variable data are based on commercial databases. Acquisition investments were 
taken from the Thomson ONE database. Greenfield investments were taken from the 
Financial Times fDi Markets database. Both of these databases have been used extensively 
in past research and are considered to be valid sources of secondary data. We follow the 
normal 10% ownership threshold for acquisition investments and minimum values of 
around $450,000 for greenfield investments. This dataset initially included 165 acquisition 
investments and 48 greenfield investments.  Upon further scrutiny of individual 
investments, however, only 112 acquisition and 44 greenfield investments were included. 
The 53 acquisition and 4 greenfield investments were excluded due to the inability to verify 
the validity or value of the transaction. In total, our sample consists of 156 transactions 
across Canada in the time period 2003-2013. Breakdowns of both greenfield and acquisition 
investments across the 13 Canadian provinces and territories can be found in Tables 3 and 
4. 
 
******** TABLES 3 & 4 ABOUT HERE ******** 
 
Alberta dominated FDI flows in terms of value with British Columbia a distant second during 
our period of study. Regarding frequency (count) of FDI projects, however, Ontario and 
British Columbia registered by far the most investments with Alberta a distant third.  Four 
provinces did not register any FDI from China during the period of study: New Brunswick, 
Northwest Territories, Nunavut and Prince Edward Island. 
The main explanatory variable in this study is the experience and intensity of provincial IPAs 
in China. Provinces which had at least one IPA located in China at some point in the period 
of study include: Alberta, Ontario, British Columbia, Québec and Saskatchewan. This 
equates to just under 40% of all provinces.  Individual provinces, however, first opened IPAs 
in China at different times and sometimes had more than one IPA in China in a given year. 
Thus, ideally, we would measure not only whether a province maintains an IPA in China, but 
16 
 
also the intensity of its efforts. Such intensity has been defined as the number of employees, 
operational budget, number of IPAs and years established in past studies (Lim, 2008). Each 
IPA and the respective home governing body for each foreign IPA was contacted in search of 
the above information. Only information on the number of IPAs maintained and IPA 
establishment years were available on a consistent basis. 
In the case of generating FDI from source countries which are qualitatively dissimilar to the 
host economy, experience is likely to be important. Alberta, for example, opened its first IPA 
in China (Beijing) in 1999 while British Columbia opened its first IPA in China in 2007 
(Shanghai). The experience gained by Alberta’s IPA in China throughout the several years 
prior to British Columbia opening its first IPA in China may be of significance to 
understanding the relative efficacy of IPAs’ ability to generate FDI. Thus, the number of 
years a province has maintained an IPA is important.  
Measuring IPA efforts through the number of years in which a given province has 
maintained an IPA does not, however, consider the relative intensity of its efforts. For this 
reason we also incorporate the number of IPAs maintained in our main explanatory variable. 
We elect to measure relative IPA experience and intensity as cumulative IPA years by 
number of provincial offices. Using this method, each year an individual IPA office is in place 
is counted as one year. British Columbia, for example, did not have any IPAs in China up to 
2006 so these years would be recorded as ‘zero cumulative IPA years’. In 2007 British 
Columbia opened its first IPA so this would be recorded as ‘one cumulative IPA year’. 2008 
did not see any expansion or contraction in British Columbia IPAs, so it would be recorded as 
‘two cumulative IPA years’. 2009 saw the addition of two British Columbia IPAs so would be 
recorded as ‘five cumulative IPA years’, and so on. By using cumulative IPA years, experience 
and intensity of effort are considered in a meaningful manner. 
FDI flowing from China into Canada could, of course, be motivated by factors other than 
IPAs. Drawing from similar previous studies we control for economic size, provincial 
corporate tax rate, strategic asset availability and natural resource exports.  As previously 
mentioned, in the specific context of Canada, the sizes of provinces vary widely.  Thus, 
geographic area (square kilometres) is also included.  Furthermore, many Chinese outward 
FDI location choice studies also control for the geographic distance from Beijing to the host 
economy as well as levels of Chinese diaspora in the host economy.  Finally, while not 
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typically controlled for in Chinese outward FDI studies, past work on the impact of state or 
provincial policy on generating exports and/or FDI typically includes a variable on the use of 
trade missions.  While the overarching objective of trade missions is generally to facilitate 
export opportunities, the generation of FDI is typically seen as a tertiary benefit. We, 
therefore, also control for high-level trade missions involving provincial premiers. 
Dependent and independent variables were logged where appropriate as indicated in Table 
5. Table 5 includes details for all dependent, main and control variables. 
 
******** TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE ******** 
 
 
3.1.2 Model definition 
In the case of developed economy IPAs, the measurement for efficacy is typically either the 
quality or quantity of generated investments. Quality is generally defined in terms of the 
monetary value of investments while quantity focuses on the number of investments. In 
order to gain a holistic view of the efficacy of IPAs from developed economies, we estimate 
the impact of IPAs against both the values and counts of Chinese FDI into Canadian 
provinces.  We estimate the value of investments in our unbalanced panel data set through 
the use of random effects generalized least squares (GLS). 
This model is estimated as:  
(1) FDI_VALUEit =  f (β1IPAit, β2GDPit, β3TAXit, β4PATit,β5NRit, β6TRADEit, β7CULit, β8SIZEit, 
β9DISt,) 
Where FDI_VALUEit is the value of FDI in year t (t=1,…T) in province i (i =1,…I).  The 
correlation matrix for the aforementioned model can be found in Table 6.  While 
multicollinearity is not a major concern in our dataset, heteroscedasticity could be an issue.  
After calculating the modified Wald statistic (which tests for groupwise heteroscedasticity in 
the residuals), the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is rejected.  According to Baltagi, 
Bresson and Pirotte (2005) GLS is a suitable methodology for linear data where the 
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variances of the dependent variable are unequal (i.e. heteroscedasticity). After running the 
Hausman test, it was determined random effects models are best suited to our data. 
 
******** TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE ******** 
 
 
Our second estimation seeks to model the counts of Chinese investment in Canadian 
provinces. To do this we test Poisson and negative binomial models. Negative binomial 
models are typically used in place of Poisson models in cases where unobserved 
heterogeneity in the data exists (Cameron & Trivedi, 2013).  See Hilbe (2011) for an 
excellent review of negative binomial methodology. 
Our second model is defined as: 
(2) FDI_COUNTit =  f (β1IPAit, β2GDPit, β3TAXit, β4PATit,β5NRit, β6TRADEit, β7CULit, β8SIZEit, 
β9DISt,) 
Where FDI_COUNTit is the value of FDI in year t (t=1,…T) in province i (i =1,…I). After 
estimating models for both Poisson and negative binomial models, likelihood-ratio tests 
favoured the use of negative binomial models.  Over-dispersion was also found to be 
present in the data set. 
In the case of exploring the impact of IPAs on generating FDI, causality could be a major 
cause for concern.  The argument could be made that increases in Chinese FDI in a given 
province are causing provincial governments to open IPAs in China rather than provincial 
IPAs leading to the generation of Chinese FDI into a province.  The causality conundrum is 
not unique to this study. In fact, in a recent study Head and Ries (2010) go to great lengths 
to tease out potential biases related to causality when analysing the impact of Canadian 
trade missions on exports.  As well as determining Canadian trade missions do not 
significantly increase trade, they also lay out several methods for effectively exploring 
causality issues.  Unlike Head and Ries (2010) there does not seem to be a high or significant 
level of correlation between residuals and the IPA variable in this study. Further, tests to 
confirm whether or not endogeneity is an issue in our data were also performed. One such 
method discussed in Head and Ries (2010) which can appropriately be applied to our case  is 
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the incorporation of lagged dependent variables. This method helps ‘capture unobserved 
factors promoting trade between Canada and mission countries that existed prior to the 
missions’ (K. Head & Ries, 2010, p. 765).   
After lagging the dependent variables, our model estimates did not give any indication 
previous levels of Chinese FDI into Canada influence current FDI flows. More specifically, 
lagging the dependent variables one-year, two-years and three-years did not yield any 
improvement in model fit. Coefficients on the IPA effects did fall when using lagged 
dependent variables, but not significantly.  
Results from the more familiar Granger-causality test provide similar results. When testing 
the causality of FDI flows on the presence of IPAs the null hypothesis of non-causality is 
confirmed. When the order of variables is reversed, however, the null hypothesis of non-
causality is rejected.  This suggests a unidirectional relationship (Granger, 1969).   
In regards to the Granger causality test, Sanfilippo (2010) comment, ‘causality tests should 
be cautiously considered as a source of information on the direction of causality in the 
absence of other variables (Greene, 2003). Rather than causality, this kind of test 
determines which of the two variables follows the other and, thus, “precedence” is 
considered a more appropriate term to describe what a Granger test effectively captures’ 
(p. 603).  Thus, it is appropriate to infer the presence of provincial IPAs proceed the location 
choice of Chinese FDI. 
 
4. Results and discussion 
4.1 Results 
Results are presented for both GLS and negative binomial model estimations.  Table 7 
reports the results from the GLS model specified in equation (1) which uses the value of 
investments as the dependent variable as well as results from the negative binomial model 
specified in equation (2) which uses the number of investments (count) as the dependent 
variable.  Both models are estimated against an identical set of main and control 
independent variables. 
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******** TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE ******** 
 
Despite geographic and industrial composition differences between models, major results 
are similar. Irrespective of the dependent variable used, the results indicate the presence of 
a Canadian provincial IPA is highly significant and positively related to the location choice of 
Chinese FDI. These results indicate the presence of a developed economy IPA increases the 
likelihood that an EM firm will invest in a given location. In both models Chinese FDI is also 
significantly drawn to economically large provinces. These results, which are consistent 
across models, indicate economically large provinces are more likely to receive FDI from 
China than economically small provinces, but the relative intensity of provincial IPA efforts, 
regardless of economic size, will increase the likelihood of generating Chinese FDI. More 
specifically, due to random effects negative binomial models implicitly accounting for 
conditional marginal effects for each variable (at the mean), we can interpret the results of 
our count model as: each additional 6.6 ‘cumulative IPA years’ will, on average, generate 
one additional investment. The mean investment value in our sample was approximately 
$306 million. Interpretation of our modeling results broken down into values indicates, 
therefore, each additional ‘cumulative IPA year’ can, on average, be expected to generate 
approximately $46.4 million in additional investments per year due to IPA efforts.1 While 
this is an average across provinces for our time period and should, therefore, be interpreted 
with caution, it is clear the addition of (Canadian) provincial ‘cumulative IPA years’ will lead 
to significant increases in FDI from Chinese MNEs. 
When using the count of FDI projects as the dependent variable, in addition to the presence 
of a foreign IPA and large economic size, geographic distance is a significant factor where 
closer provinces are more likely to be chosen as FDI locations by Chinese firms than 
geographically distant provinces. According to count modelling estimations, high corporate 
tax rates may also draw FDI.  While this is superficially counter intuitive, it simply reiterates 
the importance of IPAs, large economic size and geographic distance. 
 
                                                          
1
 It should be noted that the above numbers are aggregated and represent long-term averages based on 
investment values and counts from 2003-2013. 
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4.2 Discussion 
Given the high psychic distance between China and Canada, finding IPAs significantly impact 
the location decision is, perhaps, unsurprising. One explanation is that the increased 
transaction costs for Chinese MNEs associated with overcoming LOF in a developed 
economy may have been mitigated through the bridging of information asymmetries by the 
IPAs. Québec, Saskatchewan and British Columbia commenced provincial representation 
through an IPA for the first time during the study period.  The investment patterns of 
Chinese MNEs in Québec, Saskatchewan and British Columba pre and post IPA, therefore, 
provide potentially interesting subcases to explore. 
According to Investissement Québec, which is the governing body for Québec’s IPAs 
globally, Québec opened its first IPA in China in 2007. During our period of study, Québec 
did not receive any Chinese FDI until one year after it opened its Chinese IPA office. The 
investment amount of its first Chinese FDI transaction was $46,000,000. From 2009-2011, 
Québec succeeded in generating an additional $998,000,000 in Chinese FDI.  In other words, 
in the first four years covered in this study Québec did not have an IPA in China and did not 
register any Chinese FDI.  After opening an IPA in China, Chinese FDI totalled over $1 billion 
in just five years. The story for Saskatchewan is strikingly similar. During our period of study, 
Saskatchewan received a total of $1,000,000 in Chinese FDI prior to opening an IPA in China.  
Saskatchewan opened an IPA in China in 2010 and by 2011 had generated $261,000,000 in 
Chinese FDI. British Columbia opened its first IPA in China in 2007. From 2003 to the end of 
2007 British Columbia generated a total of nine investment from China. In the first year 
alone after opening an IPA in China (2008) British Columbia generated nine FDI projects 
from China. While opening IPA offices in China may not be the sole reason for increased 
levels of Chinese FDI, it seems to be a positive determinant. 
Why do IPAs appear to stimulate Chinese MNEs to invest in a given Canadian province when 
these firms have a wide choice of locations? Extant literature suggests Chinese MNEs face 
particular challenges when locating in institutionally developed markets such as Canada 
(Child & Marinova, 2014; Meyer, Ding, Li, & Zhang, 2014). In general Chinese businesses 
have developed within a challenging domestic institutional context, including: bureaucratic 
obstacles; inefficient regulatory environments; and opaque political institutions. As a result 
Chinese business leaders often seek out alliances with political bodies and decision makers 
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in their home market (Walder, 2011). Further, Chinese MNEs are typically ‘infant’ MNEs 
which are directly influenced by ‘home country effects’ (i.e. the influences of their country 
of origin on their behaviours) (Narula, 2012; Ramamurti, 2012; Zhou & Guillén, 2014). When 
expanding abroad, the embedded behaviour of seeking legitimacy within home country 
political confines naturally extends to parallel considerations in the host economy. Locally 
available (i.e. in China) provincial-level Canadian IPAs may be important agents for 
facilitating Chinese MNEs’ desires for host country legitimacy. More specifically, the growth 
of successful Chinese businesses is in some cases built around business to government 
linkages and in all likelihood Chinese MNEs will look, where possible, to nurture such 
linkages when internationalizing (Meyer et al., 2014). IPAs may therefore play a particularly 
important role in lowering the LOF for nascent Chinese MNEs entering the Canadian market 
by helping them understand Canadian institutional and political rules, norms and values. 
Thus, IPAs’ role in ‘investment facilitation’ is likely to be important to potential Chinese 
investors (Wells & Wint, 2001). 
The investment facilitation role IPAs play is likely to be especially meaningful due to the 
industrial composition of our sample. Investments by Chinese MNEs into Canadian 
provinces are dominated by the natural resource extraction sector in both value and count 
measures. Natural resource extraction can be a contentious issue for both foreign and 
domestic companies in Canada due to complex measurements of ‘net socio-economic 
benefit’. Chinese MNEs may be drawn to IPAs which provide specific services to help 
navigate complex rules, regulations and expectations of natural resource extraction FDI. 
More specifically, IPAs may give examples from past investments on how ‘net socio-
economic benefit’ to the host country was derived. From the investing firms’ perspectives, 
this may aid in assessing the value of potential investments and ultimately increase the 
chances of approval. The services of IPAs may be especially valuable in the case of Chinese 
FDI into Canada in the natural resource extraction sector as the vast majority of investment 
in this area are undertaken by Chinese SOEs. 
Recent national-level amendments to the Invest in Canada Act which aims to increase 
scrutiny of investments made by foreign state-owned firms in Canada may spur prospective 
Chinese investors which happen to be state-owned to engage with IPAs. It is sometimes 
argued liabilities of foreignness are intensified and complicated by the omnipresence of 
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state-ownership found in many Chinese MNEs. Chinese state-owned MNEs, which dominate 
natural resource sectors, have been highly active in Canada. When compared to private 
firms, it has been argued SOEs are especially subject to the multifaceted and complex 
institutional considerations in developed host economies (Meyer et al., 2014). This is 
because state-ownership may lack legitimacy in many developed markets such as Canada 
due, in part, to purported threats to national security (i.e. via appropriation of such things as 
high-technologies and key natural resources). Further, Chinese SOEs are sometimes seen to 
exploit unfair competitive advantages stemming from domestic governmental support when 
expanding abroad (Luo, Xue, & Han, 2010). Chinese SOEs wishing to engage in FDI in 
developed economies are, therefore, particularly vulnerable to large LOF associated with 
institutional mismatches (Child & Marinova, 2014; Meyer et al., 2014). Actively engaging 
with provincial-level Canadian IPA representatives in China, who are fluent in Mandarin and 
in close geographic proximity (i.e. same Chinese city or region), may be important for 
addressing LOF which are particularly acute for Chinese SOEs. 
A major assumption about effectiveness of IPAs is, however, that the geographical reach of 
an IPA is wide enough to meaningfully assist Chinese MNEs with reducing LOF. In other 
words, the location choice of IPAs in China may be meaningful to understanding the overall 
ability of IPAs to generate FDI. In light of this, we consider the relative importance of 
provincial-level Canadian IPA geographic locations within China. Using Chinese investing 
firms’ headquarters data, we evaluate investment flows from Chinese provinces and 
municipalities (i.e. Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing) into Canadian provinces. In the 
case of municipalities, we also include investments from adjacent provinces. If, for example, 
an IPA is located in Guangzhou, only investments in Guangdong (province) are included, but 
if an IPA is located in Beijing, Beijing municipality and Hebei (province) are included, and so 
forth. Using this approach we found that 61% of all Chinese investments in Canada (by 
count) originated in Chinese provinces or municipalities which had a provincial-level 
Canadian IPA at the time of the investment (see Figure 1). 
 
******** FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE ******** 
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As the above figure indicates, IPAs tend to draw investment from MNEs in close geographic 
proximity. This finding begs further consideration of the influence of IPA location: which IPA 
location(s) in China are most important for generating FDI? When evaluating the specific 
home province or municipality of Chinese MNEs investing into Canadian provinces which 
maintained an IPA at the time of investment, we find that Beijing is by far the ‘most 
important’ location in which to locate, commanding a full 90% of such investments. While 
this result is not particularly surprising due to our sample being dominated by Chinese SOEs 
in the natural resource sector, which typically maintain headquarters in Beijing, it is 
nevertheless clear that the location of IPAs in China matters. 
In summary, of the four main functions IPAs serve (investor facilitation, image building, 
investment generation and policy advocacy (Wells & Wint, 2001)) we argue their role in 
investor facilitation is likely to be particularly important owing to the large LOF that exist 
between the Chinese and Canadian institutional contexts (Child & Marinova, 2014; Meyer et 
al., 2014). Moreover, there has recently been some suggestion that since the Chinese state-
owned oil giant CNOOC purchased Alberta-based Nexen Energy ULC in late 2012 for a 
Chinese record outward FDI sum of $15.1 billion, IPAs role in policy advocacy may be 
increasing. This deal was approved by the national government but it stirred a strong 
political backlash (i.e. the idea Canada is not for sale to foreign governments (Vanderkippe, 
2014)). As an indirect consequence of this deal, future investments involving state-owned 
enterprises will come under far greater regulatory scrutiny at the national level.  Alberta has 
subsequently seen a steep decline in Chinese FDI. As a result, Alberta’s senior IPA 
representative to the Asia-Pacific Basin, who has been engaged in discussion with business 
leaders in Beijing, has actively lobbied the national government for change. This is a prime 
example of the growing importance of the policy advocacy role undertaken by provincial-
level Canadian IPAs in China. 
 
5. Conclusion 
5.1 Conclusion 
The objective of this paper was to empirically explore the efficacy of developed economy 
IPAs in generating FDI from emerging markets, such as China. Findings indicate developed 
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economy IPAs located in emerging markets improve the likelihood of generating EM FDI.  
We propose this is due to the desire to mitigate the significant transaction costs associated 
with LOF when entering a psychically distant economy. 
The first major contribution to the literature, therefore, is to shed light on the debate of the 
efficacy of IPA offices.  In the relatively limited IPA literature set the findings are 
inconclusive.  Some previous studies find IPAs are a significant driver of FDI generation 
(Bobonis & Shatz, 2007; Lim, 2008; Morisset, 2003; Wells & Wint, 1990; Woodward, 1992), 
but the majority of past studies do not find IPAs have an impact on the location choice of 
FDI (Coughlin & Segev, 2000b; C. K. Head et al., 1999; K. Head & Ries, 2010; Kotabe, 1993; 
Martin, 2003; Wilkinson & Brouthers, 2000; Wint & Williams, 2002). Past studies, however, 
have primarily been undertaken from the perspective of developed economies pursuing FDI 
from other developed economies. In no case has the impact of IPAs been investigated with 
the focus of attracting EM FDI into a developed economy.  The rising importance of 
emerging markets as significant sources of FDI, therefore, has been completely overlooked 
in the extant literature to date. 
The second major contribution explores the potential differences in targeting EM MNEs 
rather than developed economy firms. We argue when investing in a developed economy, 
EM MNEs are qualitatively different from developed economy MNEs.  This is due to the 
large psychic distances between EMs and developed economies. Psychic distance in this 
case is described as the macro-level socio-economic factors such as language, religion and 
level of economic and institutional development (Blomkvist & Drogendijk, 2013). These high 
levels of psychic distance create substantial LOF, which, in turn, increases the transaction 
costs of EM firms investing in developed economies.  The goal of IPAs, however, is to 
alleviate LOF through the effective bridging of information asymmetries and subsequently 
generate investment. When developed economy IPAs target EM FDI rather than other 
developed economy FDI alleviating LOF becomes a much more formidable task due to high 
degrees of psychic distance. Developed economy IPAs which are up to the challenge, 
however, will reap rewards. 
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5.2 Managerial Relevance 
Our research suggests the services of IPAs are useful for Chinese managers looking to invest 
in developed markets. Similarly, from the perspective of managers or owners of businesses 
in developed market host countries, maintaining good links with domestic IPAs may be 
beneficial for those businesses looking to attract foreign investors.  Creating IPAs in 
emerging markets such as China may also be a wise policy option for developed market 
governments looking to attract inward FDI.  Such markets are becoming far more important 
contributors to global FDI flows and this trend is likely to continue. The case of Canada 
suggests their effectiveness may be particularly strong in the case of natural resource driven 
FDI, such as metals and mining, as well as other politically sensitive projects. 
 
5.3 Further research 
There are several areas within the IPA literature set which are ripe for analysis. Future 
research could, for example, look to include EM MNEs from other regions so as to expand 
the sample size and confirm the generalizability of our results. It could also attempt to 
compare IPAs from different developed markets (such as Canadian provincial IPAs with 
those of IPAs from US states in China) to see if they are equally successful in attracting 
Chinese (or other EM MNE) FDI. By comparing a greater number of provinces/states with 
IPAs in emerging markets, it may be possible to corroborate our finding that sub-national 
government IPAs independently (i.e. irrespective of sheer economic size) attract FDI from 
emerging markets.  A study which is able to analyse the impact of IPAs in generating FDI 
from sectors which require high levels of government involvement may also be a productive 
focus. In particular, analysing the role and impact of IPAs, or lack thereof, in high technology 
acquisitions, which are sometimes politically sensitive (such as Chinese firm Huawei’s failed 
attempt to acquire American firm 3Leaf) could yield interesting results. It could also be 
interesting to investigate in further detail how the location of the IPA in China affects its 
ability to generate Chinese FDI. Again, this could potentially be investigated using an 
enlarged sample of countries.  Firm-level qualitative or mixed-method studies involving 
interviews with managers of Chinese MNEs investing in developed markets may also aid in 
understanding which IPA initiatives are most efficacious and ultimately stimulate firms to 
undertake FDI in a given location. Finally, investigating the impact of national-level inward 
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FDI policy on IPAs effectiveness may produce interesting results. Did, for example, the 2012 
national-level amendments to the Invest in Canada Act which aims to increase scrutiny of 
investments made by foreign state-owned firms in Canada increase or deteriorate the 
relevance of IPAs? Clearly, there are many avenues worth pursuing in this under-researched 
area. 
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Tables and figures 
 
Table 1: Sectoral distribution of Chinese FDI in Canada by number of transactions from 2003-
2013 
Sector Count Percentage 
Metals & Mining 81 52.29% 
Oil & Gas 18 11.54% 
Telecommunications 12 7.69% 
Financials 12 7.69% 
Industrials 9 5.77% 
High Technology 6 3.85% 
Consumer Products and Services 5 3.21% 
Professional Services 5 3.21% 
Healthcare 3 1.92% 
Consumer Staples 3 1.92% 
Retail 2 1.28% 
Source: Thomson ONE and FT fDi Markets 
 
Table 2: Sectoral distribution of Chinese FDI in Canada by value (millions) of transactions 
from 2003-2013 
Sector 
Value 
(millions) Percentage 
Oil & Gas $37275.58 78.02% 
Metals & Mining 9092.93 19.03% 
Industrials 400.67 0.84% 
High Technology 299.68 0.63% 
Financials 282.74 0.59% 
Telecommunications 271.83 0.57% 
Consumer Products and Services 68.60 0.14% 
Retail 31.41 0.07% 
Professional Services 31.20 0.07% 
Healthcare 13.75 0.03% 
Consumer Staples 11.34 0.02% 
Source: Thomson ONE and FT fDi Markets 
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Table 3: Distribution of Chinese FDI in Canada by value Millions of transactions from 2003-
2013 
Province GF Value Acq Value Total Value 
Alberta 347,300,000 34,288,139,000 34,635,439,000 
British Columbia 268,350,000 8,939,601,000 9,207,951,000 
Manitoba 62,000,000 18,981,000 80,981,000 
New Brunswick - - - 
Newfoundland - 69,082,000 69,082,000 
Northwest 
Territories 
- - - 
Nova Scotia - 8,242,000 8,242,000 
Nunavut - - - 
Ontario 733,770,000 1,633,228,000 2,366,998,000 
Prince Edward 
Island 
- - - 
Québec 877,010,000 211,607,000 1,088,617,000 
Saskatchewan 3,100,000 262,293,000 265,393,000 
Yukon - 57,067,000 57,067,000 
Total $2,291,530,000 $45,488,240,000 $47,779,770,000 
Source: Thomson ONE and FT fDi Markets 
 
 
Table 4: Distribution of Chinese FDI in Canada by number (count) of transactions from 2003-
2013 
 
Province 
GF 
Count 
Acq 
Count 
Total 
Count 
Alberta 4 21 25 
British Columbia 11 41 52 
Manitoba 2 1 3 
New Brunswick - - - 
Newfoundland - 3 3 
Northwest 
Territories 
- - - 
Nova Scotia - 1 1 
Nunavut - - - 
Ontario 20 35 55 
Prince Edward 
Island 
- - - 
Québec 6 6 12 
Saskatchewan 1 3 4 
Yukon - 1 1 
Total 44 112 156 
Source: Thomson ONE and FT fDi Markets
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Table 5: Variable explanations, data sources, and expected signs 
Variable 
Variable 
Abbreviation Proxy 
Main or 
Control 
Variable Data Source 
Chinese FDI in 
Canada 
FDI_VALUE Value of Chinese FDI projects in 
host province (log) 
Dependent Thomson ONE; FT fDi 
Markets  
Chinese FDI in 
Canada 
FDI_COUNT Frequency count of Chinese FDI 
projects in host province 
Dependent Thomson ONE; FT fDi 
Markets  
Provincial IPAs IPA Cumulative IPA years by number 
of provincial offices in China 
Main Contact with provincial 
governments and IPAs 
Market Size GDP Provincial gross domestic product 
(log) 
Control Statistics Canada 
Taxation TAX Province corporate tax rate 
(highest marginal tax rate) 
Control Canada Revenue Agency 
Strategic Assets PAT Canadian (federal) patents per 
capita (log) 
Control Canada Intellectual 
Property Office 
Natural Resources NR Natural resource exports as a 
proportion of total exports 
Control Statistics Canada 
Trade Mission TRADE Dummy variable where 1 = the 
provincial Premier led a trade 
mission to China 
Control Media reports; contact 
with provincial 
governments and IPAs 
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Cultural Proximity CUL Dummy variable where 1 = 
provincial ethnic Chinese 
population is more than 1% of 
total provincial population, 0 
otherwise 
Control Statistics Canada (2006 
Census) 
Geographic Size SIZE Geographic size (scaled square 
kilometres) of provincial land 
excluding fresh water (log) 
Control Statistics Canada 
Distance DIS Geographic distance from Beijing 
to the capital of the host province 
(log) 
Control www.geobytes.com 
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Table 6: Correlation matrix 
 IPA GDP TAX PAT NR TRADE CUL SIZE DIS 
IPA 1.0000         
GDP 0.5530 1.0000        
TAX -0.3273 -0.3016 1.0000       
PAT 0.1238 0.5925 -0.0518 1.0000      
NR 0.0419 -0.1430 -0.0592 -0.0920 1.0000     
TRADE 0.3947 0.2456 -0.0703 0.1222 -0.0432 1.0000    
CUL 0.3659 0.4364 -0.1935 0.1106 -0.2553 0.2176 1.0000   
SIZE 0.2240 0.2289 -0.3577 -0.2535 0.3171 0.0015 0.0526 1.0000  
DIS 0.0216 0.4563 0.0425 0.5850 -0.5276 0.1106 -0.0895 -0.4580 1 
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Table 7: Generalized least squares and negative binomial model estimations 
2003-2011 
FDI VALUE 
MODEL 
FDI COUNT 
MODEL 
IPA .4412702 *** .1516815 *** 
 (.0810617) (.0345926) 
GDP .7175869 ** .7916014 *** 
 (.3102149) (.2685447) 
TAX .1199982 .160224 * 
 (.1177924) (.093944) 
PAT .1407505 1.528333 
 (.1862164) (.9489446) 
NR -.812204 -.1110616 
 (1.133728) (1.126642) 
TRADE .0189391 -.1162644 
 (.6461284) (.3087032) 
CUL .1741278 .3934003 
 (.8282403) (1.264243) 
SIZE .1447343 1.101292 
 (.6043396) (.8901645) 
DIS -15.26542 -12.00536 ** 
 (10.49507) (5.49703) 
CONSTANT 42.08184 11.36071 
 (39.73176) (23.57624) 
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 143 143 
Adjusted R2 .2032  
LLH  -117.55211 
AIC  1.9002686 
Coefficients reported with robust standard errors in parentheses.   LLH = Log Likelihood.  AIC = Akaike 
Information Criterion.  Asterisks ***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
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